A dialogue between a foreign philosopher and a powerful statesman outline Plato's reflections on the family, the status of women, property rights, and criminal law.

An English translation of an historically oriented inquiry into Epicurean thought concerning religion. The theme of ataraxia and its consistency with a belief in the existence of the gods is developed in relation to Epicurus' thought concerning friendship, religion, and the Stoic doctrine which grew out of Plato's Timaeus.--J. E. B.

Wind makes abundant references to such classical philosophers as Plato, Plotinus, and Seneca in his elucidation of Renaissance works of art in terms of pagan myths and rites. His study is scholarly and full and is well illustrated with excellent plates.--F. E. B.

This long-awaited new edition contains eight of the dialogues of Plato, and is the first in a new five-volume complete edition of his works in the OCT series.

E.R. Dodds’ 1959 edition of Plato’s Gorgias is a conventional treatment of this dialogue, aimed at audiences interested in close study of the text. Dodds himself regretted this outcome. He felt he had lost sight of an earlier goal, formulated at a time of political turmoil on the eve of WorldWar II, of using the Gorgias to bring out ‘both the resemblance and the difference between Plato’s situation and that of the intellectual today’. The present paper attempts to (...) reconstruct that goal, as it survives residually in his edition, surfaces in his The Greeks and the Irrational, and appears in some writings from the 1930s, particularly in unpublished lectures. Dodds did frequently juxtapose ancient and modern conceptions of the intellectual, and in a way that cast Plato in a positive light, as someone politically engaged and self-critical, and acutely sensitive, as Dodds himself was, to the political implications of social psychology. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Prima Facie Duty to Obey: A Brief History Implications of Catechistic Metaethics for the Duty of Obedience Implications of Commonalist Metaethics for the Duty of Obedience Conclusion References.

Plato's Sophist begins with an attempt to arrive by division at a definition of a Sophist. In the course of the attempt six different descriptions are discussed and the results summarized at 231 c-e. A seventh and final account may be said to occupy the whole of the rest of the dialogue, including the long digression on negative statements. The first five divisions characterize with a considerable amount of satire different types of sophist, or more probably different aspects of (...) the sophistic art. The sixth division is very different. To quote Cornford's words, ‘satire is dropped. The tone is serious and sympathetic, towards the close it becomes eloquent’. (shrink)

In editing Plato's Sophist for the new OCT vol. I, ed. E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson, and J. C. G. Strachan , there was less chance of giving novel information about W = Vind. Supp. Gr. 7 for this dialogue than for others in the volume, since Apelt's edition of 1897 was used by Burnet in 1900 and was based on Apelt's own collation of W. The result was better than the (...) somewhat confused information printed by Burnet, even in his 1905 reprint, for W for the other dialogues in vol. I. But in the Sophist as elsewhere in vol. I collations largely due to Dr W. S. M. Nicoll added new facts about all of BDTWP and their correctors, and the search for testimonia largely carried out by Dr E. A. Duke added new facts in that area. A reviewer counts 66 changes in our text of the Sophist, which may perhaps be a slight over-estimate. Classification of changes as substantive or as falling into different groups is sometimes difficult, but I think plausible figures are as follows. We have in 25 places made a different choice of readings from the primary mss. and testimonia. We have printed conjectures where Burnet kept a ms. reading in 17 places, but conversely we have reverted to a ms. reading where Burnet had a conjecture in 8 places. We have printed alternative conjectures to conjectures adopted by Burnet in 6 places. So we have actually departed from the primary sources on at most 9 more occasions overall than Burnet. What must be noted is that Burnet had already printed conjectures on something like 87 occasions , so our percentage addition to Burnet's departures from the primary sources is modest. Moreover Burnet printed about 25 readings from testimonia; we have followed him in 20 or so of these cases, and this in turn implies that the primary mss. are in error at these further 20 places. It needs to be underlined that though Burnet undoubtedly deserved to be regarded as a safe and cautious editor, nevertheless he departed from the primary mss. on average about twice per Stephanus page in this dialogue. Sometimes, of course, testimonia showed him right to do this, but testimonia cover only a quite small part of this dialogue. Otherwise Burnet accepted almost 90 conjectures. For the Politicus the figures are fairly similar; Burnet accepted 22 Byzantine conjectures and 35–40 more modern ones. The new OCT there adds 15 or so more conjectures. (shrink)

I argue that, in the Prior Analytics, higher and above the well-known ‘reduction through impossibility’ of figures, Aristotle is resorting to a general procedure of demonstrating through impossibility in various contexts. This is shown from the analysis of the role of adunaton in conversions of premises and other demonstrations where modal or truth-value consistency is indirectly shown to be valid through impossibility. Following the meaning of impossible as ‘non-existent’, the system is also completed by rejecting any invalid combinations of terms (...) in deductions or conversions. The notion of impossibility reaches the core of Aristotle's system in the Prior Analytics. On the one hand, the use of adunaton shows that he is following one of the two requisites for demonstrative science formulated in the Posterior Analytics, i.e. to demonstrate that it is impossible for things to be otherwise than stated. On the other hand, that demonstrations through impossibility are rooted in the notion of contradiction supp.. (shrink)

In the "cratylus", Plato presents two theories about the correctness of names, I.E., Names are correct by nature and names are correct by convention. In this paper, I argue that plato holds both views because he recognizes that the word 'name' is ambiguous as between type and token. Name tokens (individual strings of marks and noises) are conventional for plato. But name types (the role played by the tokens or the concept expressed by the tokens) are not (...) conventional for plato. (shrink)

These are three welcome works on medieval logic. The Summa Logica of William of Ockham has long been a classic, and scholars have been waiting for this critical edition, begun almost a quarter of a century ago by Philotheus Boehner and finally brought to completion by the combined efforts of Stephen Brown and especially Gedeon Gal, now the general editor of the Opera Philosophica et Theologica being prepared at the Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure University. The editors date this work (...) after the Commentary on the Sentences, two volumes of which have already appeared in the above mentioned series. It also postdates Ockham’s commentaries on Porphyry, the Praedicamenta, Perihermenias, and Sophisticis Elenchis, as well as the first four books of Aristotle’s Physics. As a terminus ante quem the editors take the fifth book of this same Physics and see it as certainly prior to the Tractatus de praedestinatione, and to the De corpore Christi and De Sacramento Altaris. Parts of the Quodlibetal questions, however, precede it, and others follow. Loux’s translation, unfortunately, antedated this splendid edition of the Summa Logicae, being based on only the partial, earlier edition of Boehner. Nevertheless, it is a useful instrument providing a good and relatively complete introduction to the basic themes of Ockham’s philosophy of language as well as his ontology. A spot check reveals some misprints, e.g., on pp. 56, 192 and on page 38, lines 68-83 of the Latin edition he used have not been translated. The work is introduced by two essays: "The Ontology of William Ockham" and "Ockham on Generality"—the latter dealing with his theory of supposition. Nuchelmans’ interesting work, though it deals mostly with the medieval history of propositions as bearers of truth and falsity, contains some six chapters which trace the history of the term as early as Plato’s treatment in the Sophist, through Aristotle and the important Stoic lekton and axioma. He also concludes with a useful chapter on the significance of a true propositio, both as a mode of being of a thing and as the mental conception.—A.B.W. (shrink)

The centrepiece of Cicero's De re publica is a discussion of justice. This discussion, which evokes the theme of the Platonic dialogue after which it was named, consists of a set of three speeches. It begins with a speech opposing justice, placed in the mouth of L. Furius Philus and alleged by him to be modelled on the second of a pair of speeches for and against justice delivered in Rome in 155 B.C. by the Greek Academic philosopher Carneades. Philus' (...) speech lays the dialectical foundation for the two subsequent speeches, a defence of justice as the prerequisite for government by C. Laelius, and an explanation of its role in various forms of government by Scipio Aemilianus. (shrink)

Readable translations of Plato's Philebus and Epinomis, from A. E. Taylor's unpublished papers, with the Sophistes and Politicus to follow in a further volume. The long introduction to the Philebus by Taylor amounts to a commentary; it is clear, well-organized, perceptive on the psychological-ethical level, sometimes suggestive on the metaphysical level. Lloyd's introduction to the Epinomis summarizes the problems of its content, and the discussion of its genuineness, with special reference to Taylor's position, sensibly concludes that the question is (...) still moot, depending "on our interpretation of Plato's mind." --C. B. (shrink)

This book, splendidly produced by Messrs. Nelson, comes to us from beyond the tomb. The great platonist whose text it is died in 1945. The present work is a first selection from a set of unpublished papers by him, which were deposited in Edinburgh University Library after his death. These papers are mainly translations and studies of the later Platonic dialogues, commencing with the Theaetetus. They represent the author’s labours in the years 1933-4, following the publication of his ‘magnum opus’, (...) Plato, the Man and his Work and of his translations of Timaeus and Critias ; Parmenides and Laws. The author’s own intention had been to publish the translations of the Sophistes, Politicus and Philebus together. The editor and publishers have in this edition decided to bring out the Philebus and Epinomis in one volume, leaving the Sophistes and Politicus for later publication. The long introduction to the Philebus is from the pen of A. E. Taylor himself; the introduction to the Epinomis has been supplied by A. C. Lloyd. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.3 (2006) 467-468 [Access article in PDF] Richard Hunter. Plato's "Symposium". New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Pp. xiii + 150. Cloth, $40.00. Paper, $14.95. The editors of the series in which Plato's "Symposium" appears state that its constituent texts are to be "essays in criticism and interpretation that will do justice to the subtlety and complexity of the works under (...) discussion" (vi). In the preface, Hunter identifies as his audience "those who have already read or are in the process of reading the Symposium" (ix).Plato's "Symposium" has much to offer to classics students and to the general reader. The book provides useful literary and cultural background regarding the conduct of Greek symposia (5–15). It is filled with valuable interpretive remarks, as for example when Hunter proposes that Alcibiades' depiction of Socrates "as a carved Silenus" instantiates a "common form of sympotic verbal game, the 'likeness'—'Why is X (usually one of the symposiasts) like Y (usually something nonhuman)?'" (5–6). Hunter's rich knowledge of Greek literature pays off in a range of ways, as for instance in his remarks on literary articulations of erôs (16–18). The volume's final chapter, on the history of the dialogue's reception, offers a number of figures and contexts on which to reflect.Hunter makes helpful observations regarding the seriocomic and special features of Plato's recourse to it (9–11), noting that, "in the attack upon the spoudaiogeloion, it is the spoudaiogeloion itself which is the principal weapon" (36). Hunter's orientation in this regard yields nuanced interpretations of the logoi of Pausanias and Eryximachus. Hunter observes helpfully that Aristophanes' encomium functions as "an example of a very familiar aspect of the technique of Aristophanic comedy, namely, the literalization of metaphorical language (as, for example, when 'weighing up' poetry becomes a matter of real weighing in the Frogs)" (65). In Hunter's view, Agathon's contribution, in turn, illustrates Plato's contention in the Gorgias that tragedy is a type of flattery (kolakeia). Drawing on Aristophanes' Women at the Thesmophoria, Hunter makes the useful suggestion that the comic poet's depiction "can... help to explain the extravagance of the Platonic character's speech" (76).While Plato's "Symposium" will also provide valuable background to students of philosophy, on its own the book does not do justice to Socrates' encomium, in particular the crucial "ascent passage" (210a–12a). A key point of contention among philosophical interpreters of the Symposium is whether one is to read the ascent passage as "inclusive" or "exclusive" regarding erôs as directed toward individuals. (For the formulation of the controversy in these terms, see J. M. E. Moravcsik, "Reason and Eros in the 'Ascent'-Passage of the Symposium," in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, eds. Anton and Kustas [1971], 293.) The strongly exclusivist stance has had a number of exponents and is most famously associated with Gregory Vlastos (see "The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato," in Platonic Studies, 2nd ed. [1981], 31). For a contrasting view, one may consult, for example, John Brentlinger, according to whom "it does not follow from Plato's claim that we love persons (or anything else) because we believe them to be beautiful and good, that we really love the properties of beauty and goodness per se, and do not really love persons per se" (The "Symposium" of Plato [1970], 122; see also C. J. Rowe, Plato: "Symposium" [1998], 7). Hunter states that the Symposium's "apparent rejection of the value of lasting love between individuals has often seemed to modern readers to present a harshly intellectual view of erôs which ignores basic, [End Page 467] universal facts of human experience and which offers little comfort to all but a Socrates" (98). It will not, I think, be evident to readers not already familiar with pertinent philosophical literature on the ascent to just what interpretive debate this remark is (at most) a glancing gesture.Hunter quotes Symposium 210d, where Plato says that the... (shrink)

Offering a theory of imagination, and indirectly a defense of the humanities, this overly-rich and confusing work contains more literature than philosophy, and more philosophy than imagination. The author makes many suggestive comparisons: e.g., the literary equivalent of traditional positivism is the novels of Robbe-Grillet; the poetic equivalents of Peirce's firstness, secondness, and thirdness are the poems of Wallace Stevens, Ezra Pound, and T. S. Eliot, respectively. While Levi's division of the imagination into its teleological, dramatic, literary, and metaphysical forms (...) is well taken, he fails to heed Plato's warning to define the essence and not to be satisfied with a list of its kinds. The printing is careless.--A. B. (shrink)

This volume explores the relationship between rationality and happiness from ancient Greek philosophy to early Latin medieval philosophy. What connection is there between human rationality and happiness? This issue was uppermost in the minds of the Ancient Greek philosophers and continued to be of importance during the entire early medieval period. Starting with theSocrates of Plato's early dialogues, who is regarded as having initiated the eudaimonistic ethical tradition, the present volume looks at Plato, Aristotle, the Skeptics, Seneca [Stoicism], (...) Epicurus, Plotinus [neo-Platonism], Augustine, Boethius, Anselm, and ends with Abelard, the final major figure in early medieval philosophy. Special efforts are made to reveal and trace the continuity and development of the views on rationality and happiness among these major thinkers within this period. The book's approach is historical, but the topics it treats are relevant to many discussions pursued in contemporary philosophical circles. Specifically, the book aims to make two major contributions to the ongoing development of virtue ethics. First, contemporary virtue ethics often draws distinctions between ancient Greek ethics and modern moral philosophy [mainly utilitarianism and Kantianism], and seeks to model ethics on ancient ethics. In doing so, however, contemporary virtue ethics often ignores the transition from Greek ethics to the early Latin medieval tradition. Second, contemporary virtue-based ethics, in its efforts to seek insights from ancient ethics, centers on virtue. In contrast, in ancient and medieval ethics, virtue is pursued for the sake of happiness [eudaimonia], and virtue is conceived as excellence of rationality. Hence, the relationship between rationality and happiness provides the framework for ethical inquiry within which the discussion of virtue takes place. Contributors: JULIA ANNAS, RICHARD BETT, JORGE J.E. GRACIA, BRAD INWOOD, WILLIAM MANN, JOHN MARENBON, GARETH B. MATTHEWS, MARK L. McPHERRAN, DONALD MORRISON, C.C.W. TAYLOR, JONATHAN SANFORD, JIYUAN YU. Jiyuan Yu is Assistant Professor of Ancient Philosophy at the State University of New York at Buffalo. Jorge J. E. Gracia is Samuel P. Capen Chair and SUNY Distinguised Professor in the Departments of Philosophy and Comparative Literature at the State University of New York at Buffalo. (shrink)

The editors tell us this book is an outgrowth of their course in philosophical arguments. It contains both readings from traditional sources, and new material especially for this book. It is thus of interest as a potential text, as a source book, and for its original contributions. To consider it first as a text, it would be a challenging and valuable choice for sophisticated students. As a source-book, it is a good anthology of hard-core arguments on seven metaphysical topics. Authors (...) selected include Aristotle, Plato, Church Fathers, Rationalists, Locke and Hume, Bradley and Moore, Kant, Frege, Carnap, C. I. Lewis, Russell, and others. Selections run from a page or two to 16-page Hume excerpts. The last section, on The Nature of Metaphysics, contains essays newly written for this volume by A. J. Ayer, Brand Blanshard, John Passmore, and M. Lazerowitz. Other new material elsewhere in the book includes Alice Ambrose on Wittgenstein, and the introduction by W. E. Kennick. The latter suggests that in metaphysics there are arguments but no proofs, and that metaphysics has four curious characteristics: its disputes are never resolved; in these disputes the array of experts on each side is likely to be equally impressive; antinomies seem unavoidable; and metaphysics frequently conflicts with common sense. Ayer's article is called "Metaphysics and Common Sense." Using Carnap's distinction of "internal" and "external" questions, he finds metaphysical questions to be external. His explanation of what these are and why anyone would wish to raise them yields three legitimate ways in which metaphysics can add to our understanding of the world, and concludes that "it would be a mistake to forego the more imaginative kinds of conceptual exploration." In both tone and content this essay is a surprise for readers who know earlier work by Ayer. Passmore attempts to correct the popular tendency to confuse the philosopher with the sage. He places metaphysics, mathematics, and empirical science within "rational discussion": each is speculation, each has its characteristic control procedure. Blanshard's article attempts to defend metaphysics against criticisms such as those made by Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Freud. Lazerowitz treats the thesis that "metaphysics works by unseen paradoxes."--M. B. M. (shrink)

Die Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre 1794/95 (GWL) ist die erste und einzige von Fichte selbst veröffentlichte Fassung der Wissenschaftslehre und übte großen Einfluss auf ihre philosophiegeschichtliche Rezeption aus. Der Text ist schwer verständlich, denn er war nicht als ein für sich stehendes Werk, sondern als Handschrift für die Zuhörer an der Universität in Jena vorgesehen. Fichte hat ihn neben anderen Texten in einem Semester so schnell redigiert, dass man diese Fassung kaum als eine deutliche Gestaltung der Kerngedanken der Wissenschaftslehre und (...) noch viel weniger als ein vollständiges System derselben betrachten kann. Die neuere Fichte-Forschung hat in den letzten Jahrzehnten größere Aufmerksamkeit auf die neue Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre (die sogenannte Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo), die Sittenlehre, die Rechtslehre sowie ihre jeweiligen späteren Fassungen gerichtet, weil die Zeitgenossen Fichtes die weitgehende Tragweite der Wissenschaftslehre nicht genügend hätten wahrnehmen können. Es mag also beim gegenwärtigen Forschungsstand als altmodisch erscheinen, noch auf die Fassung von 1794/95 zurückzugehen. Die vorliegende Untersuchung tut jedoch eben dies und mit gutem Grund. Denn trotz der vielfältigen wissenschaftlichen Abhandlungen über die GWL bleibt es immer noch dunkel, wie man z. B. den unverhältnismäßig langen und verwirrenden „Abschnitt E“ im zweiten Teil der GWL über die Grundlage des theoretischen Wissens interpretieren und verstehen soll. In der Sekundärliteratur findet man verschiedene Einstellungen, von treuer Wiedergabe über interpretatorische Abschwächung bis hin zur Ermahnung, aber keine hat sich meiner Meinung nach auf den Abschnitt E einen passenden Reim gemacht. (shrink)

As a philosopher of sport who takes a broadly neo-Aristotelian, virtue-ethical approach, Sabrina B. Little’s The Examined Run seems tailor-made for me. Little uses Aristotle, Plato, Aquinas, and ot...

One’s first reaction on seeing this book might be to wonder why it is labelled "Aristotle" at all. The de Mundo has long been regarded as spurious, the work of a later Peripatetic, or even of the vaguely Stoicizing eclecticism which was already, in the later Hellenistic period, beginning to see Aristotle and Plato as the proponents of the same philosophy. There has, however, been no general agreement about where precisely in that framework it should be placed, and Reale, (...) who has recently tried, not without success, to rehabilitate Melissus as a serious thinker, now tries to rehabilitate the de Mundo as a genuine work of Aristotle: he thinks the lack of agreement among the critics is itself an argument in its favor. Restoring the original attribution seems to be the main purpose of what is in fact the first full scale edition with commentary of the de Mundo. It contains a text, largely that established by Lorimer, with translation en face, a long introduction, copious notes and a full word index; the text and translation occupy less than a fifth of the whole. As far as a non-Italian can judge the translation is accurate—and free of effusive expansion. The notes are a real mine of information. So it should be said at the start that whether or not one accepts Reale’s thesis about genuineness does not affect the value of the edition as such. The question of authenticity is discussed with great thoroughness in the introduction, with considerable backing, some of it perhaps inevitably repetitious, in the form of detailed discussion in the notes. At the start Reale lists the charges levelled against the work at various times. These are that in general it contains non-Aristotelian elements, that the style is completely different from Aristotle’s, as is the method, being one of assertion rather than demonstration. Further, much of the material in the scientific section is post-Aristotelian, and the "Orphic hymn" of chapter 7 shows Stoic influence. Reale argues that the first three charges will stick only if the basis of discussion is the Aristotle of the treatises and claims that the objectionable material in the de Mundo can be paralleled from the exoteric works. Thus all the pre-Jaeger discussion is misconceived. (shrink)

Ryle's recent retirement after almost a half-century of study, teaching and writing might well be regarded as the end of an era. A large segment of the philosophical world has come to regard him as the embodiment of the spirit of Oxford. His clear and informal style, his gift for fresh analogies and striking similes, his mastery of the epigram, have set new literary standards for philosophical writing. Largely responsible for inaugurating the B. Phil. and D. Phil. programs after World (...) War II for the benefit of graduate students from abroad, Ryle both as Waynflete professor of metaphysics and editor of Mind has enormously influenced the thinking of Anglo-American philosophers. Apart from his Concept of Mind, Dilemmas and Plato's Progress, his writings have taken the form of reviews, short articles or essays addressed to specific philosophical issues. Though many of these have become minor classics and have graced innumerable anthologies, it is only now that we have virtually the whole of this important segment of his writings available in book form. With the exception of four essays published originally in French, the papers in these two volumes have been published previously in English, mostly in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Analysis or Mind. They range in time from his early days at Oxford to 1968 and cover a wide range of topics, mainly in the areas of philosophical methodology, the philosophy of logic and the philosophy of mind. Only the fields of moral, political and aesthetic philosophy are comparatively neglected. The first volume contains his critical essays on individual thinkers. They include studies on Plato, Locke and Hume as well as his pieces on such contemporary thinkers as Husserl, Heidegger, Carnap, Wittgenstein, G. E. Moore and John Anderson, who dominated the Australian scene during the first half of this century. The second volume contains 37 pieces dating back to 1929. It is worth mentioning that despite their brevity, Ryle's introductions to these volumes throw considerable light on his philosophical development. While professional philosophers will be happy to have these collected papers in their present form, we hope they will soon become available in less costly editions for student use.--A. B. W. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 475 whereas in some texts Aquinas explicitly teaches that the higher senses of vision and hearing are the ones that mainly (praecipue, principaliter) lead to aesthetic experience.t5 Moreover, the statement that only in the thirteenth century was the question of the distinction between the higher and lower senses explicitly raised (p. l13f.), is true only if the author meant to exclude the pre-medieval or patristic as well (...) as the ancient period of philosophy.16 Finally, there is one technical weakness in this book that cannot be left unmentioned. The overwhelming majority of references are not to the original medieval texts treated and/or quoted in the three-volume edition, but to the number of volume and page in that edition. Thus the reader must be both familiar with French and in possession of the original three-volume work, or remain hopelessly frustrated every time he wishes to consult the original texts or at least know which texts are being mentioned. Yet, if one knows French, he does not need the English translation; and if he is also fortunate enough to have access to the original three-volume version, he will not need the abridged version of the original work at all. For this reason, should there be a second edition of this translation, the references should be changed from the l~tudes to the original medieval works. Although the negative remarks are more lengthy in this review than the positive evaluation is, it would be a grave mistake to conclude from this that the defects outweigh the value of the book. As a matter of fact, upon finishing the reading of this translation of De Bruyne's work, this reviewer was left with the conviction that, in the final balance, the reader can only greatly benefit from this work, and we all owe gratitude to the translator for having made this highly informative work available in the English language. FRANCIS J. KOVACH University of Oklahoma 1~ Summ. theol. I-II,27,1,ad 3; In Psalm. 44,2. ~6 Cf. Plato, Hipp. maL 298 A; Gorg. 474 D; Leg. XII, 961 D; Aristotle, De an. III,3, 429a 3; Augustine, De lib. arb. II,7, 16-19; 14,38; De ord. II,ll, etc. Le origini del metodo analitico: il Cinquecento. By Angelo Crescini. (Udine: Del Bianco, 1965. Published by the Istituto di Filosofia, Facnlt~ di Lettere e Filosofia of the Universit~ degli Studi di Trieste. Pp. 340. L 5,000) Professor Crescini has certainly picked a topic of great interest upon which to write. Recent students of Renaissance logic such as N. W. Gilbert, V. Mufioz Delgado, W. Ong, G. Papuli, W. Risse, and C. Vasoli have pointed out the vitality and significance associated with the development of the logical thought of the period. The general question of methodology has produced an enormous scholarly literature in recent years,I but much remains to be done before we fully understand how various methodologies have evolved and what relation philosophical discussions of method have had to the actual practice of science. Therefore, it would be most desirable to have a 1 For further information see Laurens Laudan, "Theories of Scientific Method from Plato to Mach: A Bibliographical Review," History of Science 7 (1968), 1-63. 476 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY detailed, comprehensive, and accurate study of the evolution of analytic method during the sixteenth century, particularly in view of the significance taken on by such a methodology with the 'rise of modern science'. With such a background in view the reviewer comes to this volume in anticipation of being generally enlightened on various matters. Unfortunately, Crescini's book is on the whole disappointing, although nearly everyone will find the odd bit of information of which he was not previously aware. It definitely does not, however, establish a solid foundation for later studies. The book is organized into three principal parts, dealing with the development of the analytic method in logic (pp. 21-188), in the natural sciences (pp. 189-284), and in mathematics (vv. 285-328). The first section treats discussions of the topic among writers on logical subject, under which heading are included 'humanist' logicians such as... (shrink)

Plato and Aristotle thought that philosophy begins in the perplexed recognition that there are significant puzzles one does not know how to deal with. Some such puzzles can be expressed in questions of the form, ‘How is it possible that p?’, e.g., ‘How is it possible that the world had an absolute beginning?’ I discuss an example of young children asking that last question and go on, with further examples, to make a plea for cultivating such questions as an (...) educational objective, whether the perplexity-expressing questions themselves be scientific, philosophical, or both. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 187 Later Medieval Philosophy (1150-1350): An Introduction. By JOHN MARENBON. London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987. Pp. xi, 230. $35.00. Later Medieval Philosophy (LMP), the sequel to John Marenbon's 1983 Early Medieval Philosophy 480-1150 (EMP), aims to be not a historical account of later medieval philosophy but an " introduction... intended... to help " the reader " begin his own study of the subject (...) " (p. 1). To this end "Part One examines the organization of studies in medieval universities, the forms of writing and techniques of thought, the presuppositions and aims of thirteenth- and fourteenthcntury scholars. Part Two examines in detail the way in which some important later medieval thinkers discussed a difficult and central question : the nature of intellectual knowledge" (p. 1). Marenbon justifies his two-fold approach in the "Conclusion to Part One: What is Medieval Philosophy? " (pp. 83-90). Surveying three current approaches to medieval philosophy, Marenbon notes (1) a ' separationism ' between philosophy and theology provoked by ' rationalists ' like V. Cousin and B. Haureau and preserved in Catholic philosophical circles by such exponents as Fernand von Steenberghen; (2) a view that agrees " that it is right to consider the history of medieval philosophy as a separate subject from the history of medieval theology; but it is a philosophy which, nonetheless, depends on Christian revelation and cannot be understood in abstraction from certain funda· mental tenets of the faith," viz. that of Etienne Gilson who maintains the existence of a 'Christian philosophy'; and (3) the 'modern analytic approach' advocated by Norman Kretzmann and others in the Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy ("to end the era in which it has been studied in a philosophical ghetto"). The third ap· proach de-emphasizes " the theological context " of " the particular philosophical arguments they isolate " and " the origin and literary form of texts " (p. 87) to " concentrate on the philosophical problems which they believe they share with medieval scholars " and " to translate medieval texts so far as possible into modern terms..." (pp. 8687 ). The arguments for these three approaches, however, are "based, not on historical evidence about medieval attitudes to philosophy, hut on different conceptions of what philosophy should he" (p. 88). These hermeneutical presuppositions affect the selection and arrangement of evidence by the various sorts of historian. Marenhon offers a fourth approach: ' historical analysis ', which " aims both to bridge the distance between the interests and assumptions of a modern reader and 188 BOOK REVIEWS the writings of later medieval thinkers, and yet to take account of it " (p. 89). Two restrictions are involved; historical analysts must not make " anachronistic assumptions about the identity of the problems discussed in their texts" (p. 89) and must restrict the scope of their investigations " to a single topic (or a set of individual topics) " rather than" writing... comprehensive Histories" (p. 90). Marenhon seems to recognize that there may he " patronizing " ways to take account of the difference between " medieval scholars " and " ourselves " hut such " limitations " are inescapable " conditions of disciplined thought " (p. 191). Fortunately Marenhon has moved away from the parochial assumption governing his Early Medieval Philosophy "that any thinker who appeared to share the methods and interests of ·modern British philosophers was a philosopher, and that all other thinkers were theologians, mystics, poets, scientists or whatever, hut not philosophers." He now holds "that there is no single, identifiable subject-' philosophy'which has been studied from Plato's time to the present day" (EMP, 1988 rev. ed., p. vii). Thus, Marenhon does not explicitly entertain the grand thesis that all or the most important forms of medieval philosophy are actually superior to all or the most important kinds of modern philosophy to justify the importance of studying medieval philosophy today (cf. Leo Strauss, Philosophie und Gesetz). Instead Marenhon, noting that " philosophia has a wide range of reference " (LMP, p. 66) and tacitly assuming that philosophy is an important activity, focuses on the problem of intellectual knowledge. The selection of exactly this problem, however, is not incompatible with the view that the epistemological turn characteristic of modern philosophy is still taken as normative. Accordingly, Marenhon provokes in us such questions as, Is philosophy today as good as philosophy in the hands... (shrink)

"Anyone interested in Simone Weil will want, and need, to read this superb collection." —Diogenes Allen, Princeton Theological Seminary “These essays—some written by leading specialists in Simone Weil's thought, others by prominent theologians and philosophers of religion—are especially valuable not only for elucidating Weil's reading of Plato but also for showing what one or another form of Christian Platonism can mean for us today.” —James A. Wiseman, O.S.B., Catholic University of America "This remarkable and penetrating collection of essays on (...) Simone Weil's religious philosophy illumines the living intersection between serious metaphysics and ethics. The authors carefully examine this relation that much post-modern reflection has until now only skimmed, but that Weil herself managed to embrace with breathtaking intellectual discipline and self-giving. The book is a bracing testimony to the deep moral consequences of classical ontology and its challenging Christian reorientation." —The Rev. Dr. Ephraim Radner, Ascension Episcopal Church, Pueblo, Colorado In this book a group of renowned international scholars seek to discern the ways in which Simone Weil was indebted to Plato, and how her provocative readings of his work offer challenges to contemporary philosophy, theology, and spirituality. This is the first book in twenty years to systematically investigate Weil’s Christian Platonism. (shrink)